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Confidential Informants: When Crime Pays
MILTON HIRSCH*
This Court has not yet established the limits within which the
police may use an informer to appeal to friendship and cama-
raderie-in-crime to induce admissions from a suspect, but suf-
fice it to say here, the issue is substantial.1
In the twenty years since Chief Justice Warren wrote the
above quotation, the issue-defining the limits within which the
police may use an informant-has become more substantial. In re-
ality, this issue is but one subspecies of a larger topic-the use of
"reverse stings"2 by the police. Other subspecies include, among
others, the payment of contingent fees to informants, the "target-
ing" of defendants in reverse stings, and entrapment. Generally,
courts have allowed prosecutors great latitude in this area. The
courts have recognized that the major crime involved in Florida's
drug wars requires wide-ranging responses; therefore, they have
approved such investigative and prosecutorial tools as undercover
operations, "reverse stings," and extensive use of confidential in-
formants. Nevertheless, the limits to which Chief Justice Warren
alluded must exist, and the courts have struggled to map them.
The jurisprudential fountainhead of reverse stings is William-
son v. United States.3 Williamson and co-defendant Lowrey were
* Associate with the Miami law firm of Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg,
Manley & Casey, Miami, Florida; former Assistant State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit
of Florida; B.A., 1974, University of California, San Diego; J.D., 1982, Georgetown
University.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Janet Reno, State Attorney, Elev-
enth Judicial Circuit of Florida; Linda Wells, law librarian, Office of the State Attorney,
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida; and Richard Barest and J. Brian Brennan, respectively
Chairman and Secretary of the Florida Bar Association's subcommittee on "Morality and
Reverse Stings."
1. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 444 (1963) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
2. In response to concerns over such issues, Judge Marvin Mounts of Florida's Fif-
teenth Judicial Circuit persuaded the Florida Bar Association to create a subcommittee on
"Morality and Reverse Stings." The subcommittee defined "reverse sting" as "[an opera-
tion in which law enforcement offers or attempts to deliver or sell, or actually delivers or
sells, alleged contraband."
3. 311 F.2d 441, reh'g denied, 340 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
Pre- Williamson cases are of antiquarian interest only. In Cantwell v. United States, 81 F.2d
31 (9th Cir. 1935), an officer of the United States Indian Service hired two Indians to try to
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convicted of possessing 179 gallons of whiskey in unstamped con-
tainers, in violation of federal law.4 Williamson was also convicted
of carrying on the business of a wholesale liquor dealer and of will-
fully failing to pay the special tax that federal law required.5 The
government's chief witness at trial was a confidential informant.
The witness, named Moye, bought the whiskey from Williamson
and produced the evidence against Williamson and Lowrey. The
government agents paid Moye two hundred dollars for the evi-
dence against Williamson, and one hundred dollars for the evi-
dence against Lowrey. It was the unexplained and, in the court's
view, the unjustified terms of Moye's employment that necessi-
tated reversal:
It may possibly be that the Government investigators had such
certain knowledge that Williamson and Lowrey were engaged in
illicit liquor dealings that they were justified in contracting with
Moye on a contingent fee basis, $200.00 for Williamson and
$100.00 for Lowrey, to produce the legally admissible evidence
against each of them. It may be also that the investigators care-
fully instructed Moye on the rules against entrapment and had
it clearly understood that Moye would not induce them to com-
mit a crime, but would simply offer them an opportunity for a
sale. None of these facts or circumstances were developed in the
evidence, though Moye's deposition had been taken months
before the trial.
Without some just justification or explanation, we cannot
sanction a contingent fee agreement to produce evidence against
particular named defendants as to crimes not yet committed. 7
In his concurrence, Judge Brown drew an important distinction: "I
do not think, however, that this is an aspect of entrapment. Its
kinship to entrapment is not that the act of a Government repre-
sentative induced the commission of a crime. Rather, it is that the
buy liquor from anyone who would sell it to them. The officer had never known or heard of
Cantwell and had no reason to believe that he was selling, or was disposed to sell, liquor to
Indians. The court rejected Cantwell's entrapment argument on appeal.
In Cantwell, the federal officer "furnished the (Indians] two marked $1 bills with which
to make ...purchases of liquor. . . . [Cantwell] did then and there sell and deliver to
them a pint of whisky [sic] and they paid him therefor $1.50." Id. at 31. By the time that
the ABSCAM cases came along in the 1980's, the cost of law enforcement via reverse stings
had increased slightly. See infra note 51.
4. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 441; see 26 U.S.C. § 5604(a)(1) (1983).
5. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 441 (the court mistakenly referred to the violated statute as
§ 569(a), see 26 U.S.C. § 5691(a) (1983)).
6. Id. at 444-45.
7. Id. at 444.
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means used to 'make' the case are essentially revolting to an or-
dered society." He concluded that, "[f]or Government to offer a
specific sum of money [to an informant] to convict a specified sub-
ject is really more than civilized sensibilities can stand."9 Judge
Cameron, dissenting, recognized that the ratio decidendi of Wil-
liamson was not the subjective, predisposition-type entrapment in-
volved there, but that, "[i]n the majority's view, the very fact of
hiring an informer on a contingency is ignoble" and improper.1"
In the twenty years since Williamson, courts and commenta-
tors have struggled with its teachings. What exactly a prosecutor
cannot authorize or permit an informant to do, and what actions
are impermissible remain uncertain. What rights of defendants are
implicated, and what is the remedy when those rights are trans-
gressed? On retrial, Williamson was convicted again. But the pithy
per curiam affirmance on appeal serves only to obscure and dilute
the import of the first opinion. The court stated:
On the retrial of this case, as our mandate plainly called for,
the deposition of Moye was not offered by either party for any
purpose .... Entrapment as such on this record was not there-
fore raised. Nor was there any evidence which the Trial Judge
knew either judicially, actually, or factually which indicated that
the initiation or prosecution of this case was the fruit of any
illegal contingent agreement with Moye. On the intrinsic merits,
the evidence amply sustained the finding of guilty.1 '
A contemporary commentator observed that "the opinion in
[Williamson] is distressingly ambiguous.' 1 2 Only one court before
that, in State v. Glosson,'3 found the rationale of Williamson suffi-
ciently lucid and self-explanatory to embrace wholeheartedly. To
the district court in United States v. Curry,1 4 the theory of Wil-
liamson was obvious: "[t]he evil ... is that the informer is paid
only for evidence of crimes not yet committed when the agreement
is sealed."'15
8. Id. at 445.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 446.
11. Williamson, 340 F.2d at 612.
12. Note, Recent Decisions: Criminal Law, 49 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1963).
13. 10 FLA. L. WEEKLY 56 (Sup. Ct. Jan, 18, 1985). In Glosson, the government prom-
ised to pay an informant a fee upon the successful prosecution of the defendants. The court
held that the defendants, who purchased marijuana from the informant, were denied due
process. Id. at 57.
14. 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
15. Id. at 469.
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Williamson failed to establish clear guidelines as to what con-
duct is specifically forbidden. Was it, as the Curry court stated, the
focusing on crimes not yet committed? 6 Was it the contingent fee
arrangement? Was it the targeting of Williamson and Lowrey? Or
was the court simply ruling that the prosecution failed to lay an
adequate predicate because it failed to show either the preexis-
tence of "certain knowledge that Williamson and Lowrey were [al-
ready] engaged in illicit. . . dealings," 7 or that the informant had
been "carefully instructed . . . on the rules against entrapment?" 8
The bright-line test that Judge Brown urged in concurrence-that
dismissal is required anytime the "Government . . .offer[s] a spe-
cific sum of money to convict a specified suspect"' 9-does not re-
solve these problems.
A contingent fee arrangement20 may be offensive, but courts
agree that alone it is not enough to warrant dismissal. Judge Cam-
eron pointed out in his dissent in Williamson that every informant
is, in effect, on a contingent fee basis. "Every such informer knows
16. Id.
17. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 444.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 445.
20. The court in United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1975), reproduced
with approval a jury instruction that the trial court gave that purported to define a contin-
gent fee arrangement:
If the arrangement between [the informant and the government] by word or by
deed, expressly or inferred, was such that he was to receive benefits commensu-
rate with whether or not a case was made against one or more of these defen-
dants, then that becomes a contingent fee. If the evidence is such that what
help, if any, or what pay, if any, he was to receive did not depend on the success
or validity of whatever he did in this case, then it would not be a contingent fee.
Id. at 446. Dickens does not distinguish between the contingency in Williamson, where the
government promised the informant a flat fee of $200, and that in Glosson, where the in-
formant was to receive a percentage of the civil forfeitures resulting from criminal proceed-
ings. For purposes of a defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this appears to be an
insignificant distinction. Judge Cameron, citing I.R.C. 7214(a), 7623 (1983), seems to suggest
in his dissent in Williamson that a percentage commission arrangement whereby individuals
who inform on tax evaders are routinely-awarded a percentage of the "take" is less offensive.
Williamson, 311 F.2d at 446; see also United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989 (1971) (analogizing contingent fee arrangements in criminal con-
text with percentage of fines paid to those who inform on tax evader). The analogy is inap-
posite. The collection of taxes is essentially a civil matter, and expenses of collection are
properly chargeable to the res, the collection of which is the purpose of the law. The pur-
pose of criminal prosecution is the regulation of criminal conduct and not the generation of
income. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(c), EC 7-28 (1979).
Recently, in United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984), the court up-
held a contingent fee arrangement where the informant learned after the investigation was
completed, and only a few days prior to trial, that he was to receive an additional fee for
each defendant convicted.
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that his day to day arrangement with the Government will con-
tinue only if he delivers the goods. . . . If [he] succeeds in landing
some of the criminals the Government is after, he is well paid and
his service will continue. If he does not, he is dropped."'" The con-
tingent reward for which the informant is working does not have to
be money. Instead, the court in Curry dramatically described a
common alternative.2 2 The informant's "consideration was far
more precious than money. Liberty was his objective, in the form
of a dismissal of the complaint against him. '2 3 The consensus of
opinion is that every confidential informant is on a contingent fee
basis in the sense that he must "deliver the goods" or forego re-
ward.24 The defendant's remedy is not dismissal of the indictment
or information. Rather, the method or form of reward is properly a
matter for the jury to consider in weighing the credibility of the
evidence presented at trial.2 5
The result in Williamson is most often explained not in terms
of the contingent fee arrangement but on the basis of the targeting
of the defendants. "Williamson's progeny indicates that William-
son requires reversal 'only when the specific defendant was picked
out for the informer's efforts by a Government agent.' "26
Among the line of Fifth Circuit cases that concentrate on the
targeting of defendants, United States v. Lane2 7 involved one Levy
Bradley who, after contacting the Fort Worth, Texas, police de-
partment, became a confidential informant for the Federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and participated in approxi-
mately twenty-two narcotics transactions.2" The defendants, citing
Williamson, argued that because the government obtained the in-
criminating information on a contingent fee basis, the convictions
21. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 446.
22. Curry, 284 F. Supp. at 469.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 395-96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 989 (1971).
25. United States v. Hodge, 594 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1979).
26. United States v. Lane, 693 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v.
Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282,
285-86 (5th Cir. 1976) (conviction upheld where contingent fee paid with no particular per-
son as target); United States v. Oquendo, 505 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir. 1975) (acquittal
denied where no particular person was the target of an informer who was paid for arranging
a drug purchase, but who did not go through with the deal); United States v. Durham, 413
F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir.) (conviction upheld where informer was paid to investigate numer-
ous suspects), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 839 (1969).
27. 693 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at 387.
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should be reversed.29 The court conceded the existence of the con-
tingent fee arrangement but added that "there [was] no indication
in the record that Bradley was to implicate government-targeted
defendants. To the contrary, the record demonstrate[d] that Brad-
ley randomly implicated narcotics traffickers and was not directed
toward certain individuals by the DEA."30 Similarly, in United
States v. Onori,3 1 the court found the existence of a contingent fee
arrangement:
Even so, the Williamson rule does not require that we reverse.
Williamson has been subsequently limited to require reversal of
a conviction only when the specific defendant was picked out for
the informer's efforts by a government agent. . . .Although
government agents eventually participated in the case, the rec-
ord does not show that [the informant] was directed by govern-
ment agents to make a case .... s
This language is cited with approval in State v. Eshuk,33 the lead-
ing Florida case on government use of informants. 4 In United
States v. Joseph,35 the court stated that, "[h]ere, however, the in-
formants were paid for setting up drug purchases by the under-
cover agents with no particular person as the target of the buying
efforts. . . .This factor takes this case outside the ambit of the
Williamson doctrine." 6
There are conceptual difficulties in building the Williamson
rationale around targeting. The Supreme Court of the United
States and courts generally have sanctioned targeting as an investi-
gative and prosecutorial practice. In Hoffa v. United States,7 the
Department of Justice used a convict and union associate of the
defendant to make the case. In the words of a cellmate, "[the in-
formant] told me during this time that he was working with ...
the FBI to frame Hoffa. ' ' 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court up-
held the conviction, thereby implicitly approving the practice of
targeting an individual with a view toward criminal conviction.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 387-88.
31. 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 942-43 (citations omitted).
33. 347 So. 2d 704, 708-09 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
34. See also United States v. McClure, 577 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1976).
35. 533 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1976).
36. Id. at 285-86.
37. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
38. Id. at 318 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 296 n.3.
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The Fifth Circuit and courts that have followed Williamson
have been uneasy with the notion that targeting is what made the
conduct in Williamson improper. Instead, a series of opinions,
starting with Hill v. United States,3 9 have cited Williamson as set-
ting forth a point of evidentiary procedure. As an evidentiary pred-
icate in a Williamson-type case, the prosecution must show that
the police had "prior knowledge that the accused is [going to] com-
mit the unlawful act."'40 This line of cases draws on the language in
Williamson that, "[flt may possibly be that the Government inves-
tigators had such certain knowledge that Williamson and Lowrey
were engaged in illicit liquor dealings that they were justified in
contracting with Moye on a contingent fee basis. . . . None of
these facts or circumstances were developed in the evidence
"141
In Hill, a detective named Morris expressly arranged with an
informant named Odum to assist in the apprehension and convic-
tion of the defendant. Thus, the element of targeting was present.
Moreover, Odum was paid ten dollars per day and Morris prom-
ised that he would try to get him a three hundred dollar reward if
the defendant were caught. Only a year after the Williamson opin-
ion was rendered, the Fifth Circuit found it to be inapplicable
"[w]hen the government showed, as it did here, that (1) accused
had a past record (in this case there were past convictions for the
same offense), and (2) that neighbors had informed and com-
plained to an agent of the accused's activities. '42 If neighborhood
gossip and prior convictions are an antedote to the Williamson
transgressions, Williamson is indeed weak poison. The Hill court
even allowed the introduction of this "predicate" evidence in re-
buttal rather than in the government's case in chief.43
The Fifth Circuit continued to approve of contingent fee ar-
rangements and targeting in situations where the government
could show that it operated with "prior knowledge" of the defen-
dant's potential for criminal conduct. In Sears v. United States,44
the court permitted the targeting-plus-contingent-fee practice on
the basis of prior government knowledge, where the "prior knowl-
edge" of the defendant's illicit activities came from the confiden-
39. 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964).
40. Id. at 989.
41. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 444.
42. Hill, 328 F.2d at 989 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 988.
44. 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
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tial informant. "[The informant] approached federal agents and
informed them that [the defendant] has accepted payoffs and fur-
nished protection in the past. The federal agents thus had ade-
quate grounds to believe that Sears had been or was engaging in
illegal activities. ' ' 45
This line of argument speaks the language of entrapment,
making muddy again the waters that United States v. Russell 46
cleared. To ask for proof that the government had knowledge that
the defendants were already engaged in illicit dealings is, in effect,
to ask for proof that the defendants were predisposed. But Wil-
liamson is concededly not a predisposition-entrapment case. The
pith of the defendants' argument in State v. Glosson was that, pre-
disposition notwithstanding, the government's conduct was so im-
proper that no prosecution should flow from it.47 Because a defense
claim based on governmental over-reaching is "available to even
those up to their ears in 'predisposition,' ",48 prior knowledge is ir-
relevant. Note that all of the Fifth Circuit cases adopting the
"prior knowledge" theory antedate Russell.
Furthermore, if Williamson is meant to stand for nothing
more than a fairly minor point of evidentiary procedure, then it ill-
serves the legal community. The issue of governmental misconduct
of criminal prosecutions in a free society is a far-reaching one. Its
resolution ought not to turn on small procedural technicalities.
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and citizens all have a right
and a need to know where the line of demarcation will be drawn
between those governmental means that are both justified by their
ends and consistent with due process, and those that are neither.
These issues must be resolved on their merits.
Two of the three Williamson judges-Brown in concurrence
and Cameron in dissent-recognized that Williamson should not
be grounded on evidentiary technicalities. Judge Brown stated
boldly that "[flor Government to offer a specific sum of money to
convict a specified suspect is really more than civilized sensibili-
ties can stand. '49 Judge Cameron rejected the argument but recog-
nized that "[t]he majority, in reality, reverses this case because of
45. Id. at 144; see also Harris v. United States, 400 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1968) (prior
knowledge that defendant committed an unlawful act sufficient to uphold); cf. United States
v. Ladley, 517 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975) (offering of a "bounty" for activities
leading to arrest of defendant did not violate due process).
46. 411 U.S. 423 (1973); see infra text accompanying notes 63-73.
47. Glosson, 441 So. 2d at 1180 (Nimmons, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Williamson, 311 F.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
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the ignoble part assigned by the Government to the informer."50
The prior knowledge requirement for use of an informant on a
contingent fee basis was put to its strictest test in the ABSCAM
cases and was found wanting. ABSCAM was a complex Federal
Bureau of Investigation undercover operation that ultimately led
to the conviction of a number of major political figures.5 1 The case
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.) (government's conduct in AB-
SCAM undercover operation did not reach that demonstrable level of outrageousness that
would bar prosecution of defendant congressman), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983);
United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) (in prosecution of United States Senator
and second defendant on charges arising out of ABSCAM undercover operation, evidence of
defendants' predisposition was sufficient to permit jury to reject defense of entrapment),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir, 1982)
(evidence in ABSCAM prosecution entitled jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt defen-
dant congressman's predisposition to accept a bribe), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2437 (1983);
United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.) (federal law enforcement agents' conduct
in asking defendant, an employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to provide
a green card in exchange for a bribe did not violate due process), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 78
(1982); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (no entrapment as a
matter of law where evidence that government presented was sufficient to permit jury to
find that defendants had a sufficient predisposition to commit the crimes), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
Judge Kaufman cogently set out the mechanics and expense of a typical ABSCAM re-
verse sting in his opinion in United States v. Alexandro:
Beginning in January 1979, as part of the investigation termed "Abscam,"
FBI agent Anthony Amoroso, using the pseudonym Tony DeVito, and Melvin
Weinberg, a paid informant, bore the guises of officers of a fictitious corporation,
Abdul Enterprises. Through Amoroso and Weinberg, this company supposedly
was a vehicle for investing millions of dollars of the wealth of oil-rich Arab
sheiks, Kambir Abdul Rahman and Yassir Habib, in business ventures in the
United States. To effect the goals of the investigation, Amoroso and Weinberg
would often meet with various individuals at the offices of Abdul Enterprises in
Holbrook, Long Island and elsewhere and offer them the opportunity to make
whatever business proposals they desired. If illegal schemes were proposed, they
were pursued by the FBI.
As part of the portrait of limitless Arab riches, lavish parties were held in
Florida aboard the luxurious yacht, the Left Hand. On March 23, 1979, Alfred
Carpentier, a Long Island businessman, at the invitation of Melvin Weinberg,
attended one such party. During the course of the affair, Carpentier introduced
Amoroso and Weinberg to one of his friends, a supposed Count Montforti.
Montforti managed to create an occasion to display a diplomatic passport and
documents indicating that he was a Knight of Malta. Carpentier then interjected
that Amoroso and Weinberg, or even the sheiks, could rise to Knight of Malta
rank with diplomatic status not on merit, but by merely paying $25,000.
Carpentier had more than bogus knighthood to offer. He stated he could
provide passports and green cards for aliens by calling upon the services of Alex-
ander A. Alexandro Sr. and Jr., a father and son team who worked for the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. Carpentier, eager to generate illegal and lu-
crative business with the sheiks, offered to arrange a meeting with the
Alexandros at any time their offices were desired.
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of Congressman Kelly of Florida is instructive.2 The district court
accepted Kelly's argument that he had been the victim of outra-
geous prosecutorial excess where the investigation proceeded ab-
sent any suspicion of corruption in government generally, or of
Kelly in particular."
If the government had no knowledge of Kelly doing anything
wrong up to his rejection of illicit money, its continuing role as
the third man in a fight between his conscience and temptation
rises above the level of mere offensiveness to that of being "out-
rageous." No concept of fundamental fairness can accommodate
what happened to Kelly in this case. 4
Although the court of appeals found ample prior knowledge, on the
part of the FBI, of Kelly's wrongdoing,5 and thus was not obliged
to decide whether due process required prior knowledge,56 it still
cited with approval the opinions of other ABSCAM reviewing
courts."7 The Second Circuit in United States v. Myers,58 and the
Third Circuit in United States v. Jannotti,59 rejected the argu-
Amoroso and Weinberg reported Carpentier's offer to their FBI supervisor,
and the decision was reached to pursue it. They would ask Carpentier to obtain
a green card for an Irish alien, Thomas Foley, as a favor to the shiek [sic] who
was allegedly a friend of Foley's father. Accordingly, on May 30, 1979, Amoroso
and Weinberg met with Carpentier and explained that Foley was experiencing
difficulty emigrating to the United States. The sheik, they noted, would greatly
appreciate assistance in procuring Foley's green card. Carpentier quickly ac-
cepted the chance to turn an illegal profit, and named Alexander Alexandro Jr.
as the Immigration official who would do the job. The price was normally deter-
mined by the alien's wealth and the urgency of his need to enter the United
States, Carpentier explained. Although similar operations had cost as much as
$100,000, Carpentier believed that Alexandro, whom he stated was "very good,"
would charge only $10,000.
675 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted). Thus, although the bartered commodity
was different-influence, not narcotics-ABSCAM had all the features of a traditional re-
verse sting: the seedy informant, the undercover police officers, the temptation of quick
profit, the potential for government complicity in illegal acts, etc. In Myers, one United
States Congressman was handed $50,000 cash. 692 F.2d at 823. In Williams, the court re-
ferred to a "proposed loan of $100 million and ... proposed profits of $70 million" made
available to a United States Senator. 705 F.2d at 620.
52. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264
(1983).
53. United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 371 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
54. Id. at 376.
55. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1471.
56. Id. at 1471 n.58.
57. Id.
58. 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
59. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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ment that the government must have a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing before proceeding with an undercover operation. The
Jannotti court cited United States v. Silver,60 where the court
held that, "'it is inconsequential whether law enforcement officials
did or did not act on well-grounded suspicion that the defendant
was engaging in wrongdoing . . "61
At this point, the Williamson line of cases produces the fol-
lowing precarious standards: (1) prosecutions based on contingent
fee arrangements with informants are impermissible unless the
government can show that there was no targeting; (2) targeting is
impermissible unless the government can show prior suspicion; and
(3) lack of prior suspicion is impermissible, unless it is not.
In fact, there is no consensus about what exactly is wrong, if
anything, with the Williamson scenario. Nevertheless, for some
reason, the scenario gives courts a funny feeling in their due pro-
cess bones.
The infirmity in Williamson may be merely accidental. Wil-
liamson was decided in 1962. Prior to Russell,62 two essentially dif-
ferent theories of entrapment existed. Subjective entrapment
turned on the state of mind of the defendant. The test for subjec-
tive entrapment comprised two questions:
(1) [Did the agent induce the accused to commit the of-
fence charged in the indictment; (2) if so, was the accused ready
and willing without persuasion and was he awaiting any propi-
tious opportunity to commit the offence. On the first question
the accused has the burden; on the second the prosecution has
it.63
By contrast, objective entrapment focused on the conduct of the
government.
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court
must direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power. For answer
it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the
crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if
the criminal conduct was the product of "the creative activity"
of law-enforcement officials. 4
60. 457 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1972).
61. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609 (citation omitted).
62. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
63. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952).
64. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
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In Russell, narcotics detective Shapiro met with the defendant
and two co-defendants. Shapiro's assignment was to locate a labo-
ratory where, it was believed, methamphetamine was being manu-
factured illegally.6 5 He offered to provide phenyl-2-propanone, an
essential and legal ingredient of methamphetamine, in return for
one-half of the drug produced. 6 Shapiro also saw the defendant's
laboratory and some methamphetamine samples. Two days later,
Shapiro brought the phenyl-2-propanone and observed the manu-
facturing process. 7 He received one-half the product and pur-
chased more. 8 The following month, after purchasing additional
methamphetamine, Shapiro returned with a search warrant.6 9 On
defendant's appeal following conviction at trial, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding an "intolerable degree of governmental participa-
tion in the criminal enterprise ' 7 based on the conduct of Shapiro
in supplying the scarce ingredient. The Supreme Court, in turn,
resolved the definitional schism, holding that where a defendant is
subjectively predisposed to the commission of the crime, an en-
trapment defense must fail.71 Had Russell antedated Williamson,
the Fifth Circuit and readers of its opinions might have been
spared a great deal of confusion.
There is another reason why the legal community has been
less than eager to accept the fact that the Williamson jurispru-
dence represents a line of cases in search of a rationale. In resolv-
ing the definitional schism in Russell, the Supreme Court could
not resist leaving the back door open. The Court noted that
"[wihile we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
rev'g 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 157).
65. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 426.
69. Id.
70. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
71. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-36. This definitional schism, however, refuses to stay dead.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Vermont adopted the objective test articulated in the
Model Penal Code:
A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an
official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, [he or she] induces or encourages another person to
engage in conduct constituting such offense by . . . employing methods of per-
suasion or inducement [that] create a substantial risk that such an offense will
be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
State v. Wilkins, 473 A.2d 295, 299 (Vt. 1983) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
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process principles would absolutely bar [prosecution] . . . , the in-
stant case is distinctly not of that breed."72 Since that time, the
search by criminal lawyers for "the case" has become more than
mildly reminiscent of the search by King Arthur's knights for the
Holy Grail. This enthusiasm is understandable. The use of tech-
niques such as reverse stings is a product of the grisly battle be-
tween narcotics traffickers and law enforcement officials. Such
techniques are, perhaps, a necessary evil. Given the magnitude of
drug crime, they appear necessary; given the relative simplicity
and forth-rightness of traditional crime-fighting devices, they ap-
pear evil. Unsurprisingly, judges and attorneys concerned with the
propriety as well as the legality of police action have strained to
find a principled basis upon which to attack reverse stings.
Hampton v. United States73 represents the Supreme Court's
most far-reaching scholarship in this area. Hampton claimed that
he was a conduit in a narcotics transaction that began and ended
with the government; i.e., he was prosecuted for the distribution of
heroin that he received from a police informant and then sold to a
police officer.
The Court, in affirming Hampton's conviction, split three
ways. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a three-man plurality74 cited
the principles of Russell in denying Hampton's claim.7 5 Justice
Powell, who concurred, read the plurality opinion as announcing a
per se rule: "The plurality thus says that the concept of fundamen-
tal fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would never
prevent the conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of
the outrageousness of police behavior in light of the surrounding
circumstances. T7 But Justice Powell was unwilling to go as far as
the plurality:
[W]e left these questions open in Russell, and this case is con-
trolled completely by Russell. I therefore am unwilling to join
the plurality in concluding that, no matter what the circum-
stances, neither due process principles nor our supervisory
power could support a bar to conviction in any case where the
Government is able to prove predisposition. 7
72. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted).
73. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
74. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion; Jus-
tice Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's concurring opinion; and Justices Stewart and Mar-
shall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent. Justice Stevens took no part in the case. Id. at 484.
75. Id. at 491-93.
76. Id. at 492.
77. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted). For a brief but lucid explanation and application of
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Conversely, one well-intentioned but unsound attempt to find
the "Holy Grail" issued recently from the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida. The defendants in State v. Glosson78 were charged with traf-
ficking and conspiracy to traffic in cannabis. 79 The court dismissed
the two-count information on the ground of prosecutorial miscon-
duct." The state and the defendants stipulated to the following
facts, upon which the defendants' motions to dismiss were
presented:
1. The defense of entrapment has been asserted by each of
the defendants charged by information in this case.
2. The State's chief witness in this matter, Norwood Lee
Wilson, entered into an oral contract with the Sheriff of
Levy County, Florida.
3. The above-mentioned contract was entered into with
full knowledge, concurrence and carried out under the
investigative supervision of the State Attorney's Office
of the Eighth Judicial Circuit.
4. The conditions of this contract with Norwood Lee Wil-
son was for Wilson to receive ten percent of all civil for-
feiture proceedings filed as a result of the criminal in-
vestigations which he initiated and in which he
participated.
5. The contingency fee was to be paid out of civil forfeit-
ures going to the Levy County Sheriff's Department.
6. Norwood Lee Wilson is required to testify and cooper-
ate in the prosecution of the criminal cases filed as a
result of the investigations which he initiated and in
which he participated in order to collect the contingent
fee.
7. This case is one of the aforementioned cases.
8. The successful prosecution of this case cannot be ac-
complished without the testimony, participation, and
cooperation of Norwood Lee Wilson."
Based on these stipulated facts, the trial court entered the or-
der dismissing the information on the basis of pro~ecutorial mis-
conduct resulting in the denial of constitutional due process.8 2 The
the Hampton principles, see United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980)
(rejecting a defense of misconduct where a police informant supplied drugs to the
defendant).
78. 10 FLA. L. WEEKLY 56 (Sup. Ct. Jan, 18, 1985).
79. 441 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1179-80 (Nimmons, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1179; cf. Owen v. State, 443 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (no prosecutorial
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First District Court of Appeal affirmed in a two-to-one decision.83
Judge Joanos stated for the majority:
The state has admitted its involvement in a scheme whereby an
individual is promised payment contingent upon his successfully
making criminal cases against others to whom he is-to sell can-
nabis. . . .This "payment to make cases against criminal defen-
dants" arrangement deprives the defendants of due pro-
cess. . . .The circumstances of this case are not a situation
where the state merely seeks evidence of criminal activity but is
more akin to the manufacturing of criminal activity by the state.
We cannot tolerate such behavior under our system of constitu-
tional protections.8 4
Prior Florida case law offered little underpinning for the Glos-
son decision. The first case to give expanded consideration to the
Williamson/Glosson issues was State v. Eshuk.6 Eshuk involved a
conventional "buy/bust," as opposed to a reverse sting. The alleged
governmental impropriety lay in the use of an informant, Woosley,
who had criminal charges pending against him at all pertinent
times.8 6 After canvassing the law and concluding that targeting was
the only evil proscribed, the court found that the police conduct at
bar was not offensive.
Two years later, in State v. Dickinson,ss the Florida Supreme
Court rejected in dictum "[a] trial court's holding that a high de-
gree of law enforcement participation constitutes a defense to a
criminal charge. That issue was squarely confronted in Russell and
misconduct where the informant's fee did not depend on the effectiveness of his coopera-
tion). Owen distinguished the district court's opinion in Glosson, where the fee was contin-
gent on the success of the cases against the defendants. Id. at 176.
83. Glosson, 441 So. 2d at 1178-79.
84. Id. at 1179 (citation omitted).
85. 347 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
86. Id. at 705. Before becoming an informant, Woosley had been arrested on suspicion
of committing several burglaries. In Eshuk, a dispute arose as to whether Woosley was
promised that the investigation of his burglaries would be dropped in exchange for his coop-
eration as an informant. Id.
87. See id. at 708-09. The court distinguished Williamson by noting that the informant
in that case had been promised money if he could make a purchase of contraband from a
specified individual. This contingency fee was considered improper because it raised the
probability that the informant might use entrapment. United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d
282, 285 (5th Cir. 1976) limited Williamson by holding that it is proper to pay an informant
to set up a contraband purchase where no particular person is the target of the buying
effort. The Eshuk court held that the use made of the informant in that case was routine in
nature and that it did not matter that the informant had charges pending against him. 347
So. 2d at 709.
88. 370 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1979).
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rejected .. . ."" In State v. Brider,90 the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida, citing Dickinson, reversed the dismissal of an
information on the premise that "furnishing the contraband with
which the defendant is later charged . . does not constitute gov-
ernmental misconduct . *.". . " The second district in turn cited
Brider in State v. Sokos,92 which reversed the dismissal of an in-
formation where there was a jury question as to the defendants'
"ready acquiescence" and intent to commit the crime. In Sokos,
undercover agents went to Sokos's pizza parlor and offered to sell
him untaxed cigarettes."3 The officers had no reason to believe
that the defendant or his place of business were involved in any
criminal activity. Indeed, the entire reverse sting operation in-
volved fifty-eight individuals; five were chosen at random and the
rest were chosen on the basis of prior criminal intelligence. 4 Nev-
ertheless, the court said that "there is nothing in this record to
indicate that the transaction in question was tainted by any gov-
ernmental misconduct, much less outrageous conduct." 95
Finally, in Sarno v. State,6 the Third District Court of Appeal
of Florida rejected in a cursory fashion an "outrageous miscon-
89. Id. at 763. In Dickinson, the court held that there is "no constitutional prohibition
against a law enforcement officer providing the opportunity for a person who has the will-
ingness and readiness to break the law." Id. at 763.
90. 386 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
91. Id. at 821. The court in Brider, citing Hampton, acknowledged that because of the
problems that law enforcement authorities confront in dealing effectively with an expanding
narcotics traffic, [e]nforcement officials must be allowed flexibility adequate to counter ef-
fectively such criminal activity. Id.
92. 426 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
93. Id. at 1044. State v. Bass, 451 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), held that there is no
misconduct where the government merely provides the contraband but does not perform an
essential element of the substantive crime. See also State v. Brandon, 399 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
2d DCA 1981) (no misconduct where the government provides the money to purchase the
contraband). But see King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1958) (where a police officer con-
spires with another who unknown to him is a government agent acting in line of duty to
commit an offense under an agreement and with the intention that an essential ingredient
of the offense is to be performed by and only by, such government agent, such person can-
not be legally convicted of a conspiracy).
94. Id. at 1045. "The officers did know that sales of stolen property had been made...
next door . . . and that the defendant associated with [the neighboring establishment]." Id.
at 1044.
95. Sokos, 426 So. 2d at 1045. The defense of entrapment fails even when the defen-
dant has not been involved in prior criminal activity, or been suspected of such activity, if
the state can establish the defendant's ready acquiescence in the commission of the crime.
Thus, random solicitation of a crime is not necessarily governmental misconduct. But gov-
ernment participation in the offense can constitute misconduct. See supra note 93 and ac-
companying text.
96. 424 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
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duct" attack on a reverse sting.97 Thus, the Glosson court could
draw no support from Florida decisions; it turned to Williamson
and its progeny for precedent.
If the Williamson jurisprudence is a line of cases sailing in
search of a rationale, Glosson (to strain a metaphor) is hopelessly
at sea. First, grounded as it is wholly and solely on Williamson and
its progeny, Glosson suffers from all of the analytical infirmities of
those cases.9 8 Second, although Judge Brown's reference in Wil-
liamson to what "civilized sensibilities can stand" is the language
of due process,99 the Williamson court purported to act under the
supervisory power of the federal courts.100 The Glosson court, by
contrast, claimed to act under the due process clause. 101 Thus,
what little precedential support Glosson might have hoped to draw
from Williamson is forfeited.102 "[Tihe Supreme Court has never
applied the Due Process Clause to invalidate a conviction based on(outrageous' governmental inducement,"10 3 and "with the excep-
tion of a decision by a divided panel of the Third Circuit, United
States v. Twigg,. . . convictions have not been invalidated by fed-
eral appellate courts on grounds of excessive government involve-
ment after the decisions of the Supreme Court in Russell and
Hampton."104 Twigg105 involved the following scenario: in October
97. Sarno involved a sting operation utilizing extensive "bugging" of offices, telephones,
and informants. Because the informants had consented to the "bugs," the defendants in
Sarno did not have standing to challenge the legality of the means used to acquire evidence
against them. 424 So. 2d at 836.
98. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
99. See Williamson, 311 F.2d at 445.
100. Accord McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1943).
101. Perhaps the Glosson court took its cue from Judge Brown's due process language
in his Williamson concurrence: "For government to offer ... money to convict a specified
suspect is really more than civilized sensibilities can stand." Williamson, 311 F.2d at 445.
102. On December 13, 1983, the First District Court of Appeal reissued the Glosson
opinion, adding a few paragraphs but making no substantive changes. Glosson, 441 So. 2d
1178.
103. Williams, 705 F.2d at 619. This may be a slight overstatement. In Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court declared that a conviction must be reversed
where it was obtained by methods violative of due process. After Rochin swallowed two
capsules that police officers suspected contained illegal drugs, the officers took him to a
hospital. His stomach was pumped against his will and the capsules recovered.
The distinction between [Rochin] . . .and the . . . [ABSCAM cases] is clear.
There, the challenged conduct ranged from an invasion into the integrity of the
body to an extraordinarily coercive interrogation. The activities called into ques-
tion here, however, merely involve special investigative techniques for obtaining
evidence of Alexandro's voluntary participation and do not entail bodily inva-
sion. Moreover, not a scintilla of evidence suggests coercion.
United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982).
104. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted), cert.
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1976, a DEA confidential informant named Kubica contacted the
defendant, Neville, to discuss the setting up of a
methamphetamine laboratory.106 Kubica undertook the acquisition
of the necessary equipment, raw materials, and production site.
DEA agents supplied him with phenyl-2-propanone. 107 "Kubica
was completely in charge of the entire laboratory. Any production
assistance provided by Neville and Twigg was minor and at the
specific direction of Kubica. Twigg often ran errands for groceries
or coffee, while Neville spent much of his time away from the
farmhouse."10
The Third Circuit concluded that the governmental miscon-
duct rose to the level of a due process violation unparalleled by
Russell and Hampton. The court noted that as to Neville,
"[u]nlike other cases rejecting this defense, the police investigation
here was not concerned with an existing laboratory . . .; the illicit
plan did not originate with the criminal defendants . . .; and
neither of the defendants were chemists-an indispensable requi-
site to this criminal enterprise." 0 " Additionally, as to Twigg, "[a]ll
actions taken by Twigg . . .were at the specific direction of...
the government agent. . . .Twigg contributed nothing in terms of
expertise, money, supplies, or ideas. It also appear[ed] that Twigg
would not even have shared in the proceeds from the sale of the
drug. ' '  o
Judge Adams, in a lengthy and thoughtful dissent, pointed out
that the above-described government conduct was not qualitatively
different from that approved in Russell and Hampton."' On even
a cursory review of the factors that the majority cited-whether
the laboratory was pre-existing, and whether the criminal plan
originated with the government or elsewhere-it is obvious that
entrapment, and not outrageous governmental misconduct, was
uppermost in the court's mind. Had the majority been able to re-
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
105. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 375. When contacted, Neville expressed an interest in setting up the labora-
tory. He subsequently assumed primary responsibility for raising capital and for
distribution.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 376.
109. Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id. at 384-89. In Hampton, for example, the government not only provided the
contraband but also arranged for its sale and purchase, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); in Twigg, Judge
Adams noted that both defendants were actively part of a criminal conspiracy. 588 F.2d 373
(3d Cir. 1982).
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solve the issue on entrapment grounds, it is likely that it would
never have offered its strained interpretation of Russell and
Hampton. Unfortunately, "Twigg did not raise the issue of entrap-
ment on appeal. A defense based on entrapment would not be
available to him because he was brought into the criminal enter-
prise by Neville, not a government agent."'" 2
In Twigg, the evidence of Neville's predisposition was am-
ple.1 13 Therefore, the case could not be resolved on entrapment
grounds. The court's obvious distaste for the facts of the case-a
distaste that the dissent shared"-may have made it heedless of
its own warning in Jannotti "not to undermine the Court's consis-
tent rejection of the objective test of entrapment by permitting it
to reemerge cloaked as a due process defense.' 1 15
The Supreme Court of Florida, in its review of the appellate
court's decision in Glosson, acknowledged that Twigg stands alone
among a forest of federal cases that reject the objective due process
defense." 6 Nonetheless, the court held that an agreement to pay
an informant a contingent fee conditioned on his cooperation and
testimony in criminal prosecutions is violative of the due process
clause of the Florida Constitution. The evil is that the informant
has a powerful incentive not only to "make" criminal cases but
also to color his testimony or even to commit perjury in order to
earn the contingent fee. "The due process rights of all citizens re-
quire us to forbid criminal prosecutions based upon the testimony
of vital state witnesses who have what amounts to a financial stake
in criminal convictions.'" 117
One federal court after another has recited a littany of rebut-
tals.1 8 Most fundamentally, the "due process rights of all citizens"
112. Id. at 376 (citation omitted). The law is the same in Florida. See State v. Perez,
438 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
113. 588 F.2d at 376. Neville had previously operated a laboratory with Kubica and had
been an acquaintance of twenty years.
114. See id. at 388-89.
115. Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608. United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir.
1980), suggests that Twigg should be limited to crimes of manufacturing, as opposed to
crimes of possession, sale, or delivery. Id. at 1098. In Nunez-Rios, the court found no outra-
geous governmental misconduct where a confidential informant initiated the drug transac-
tion and provided the defendant with the drugs that the defendant then sought to deliver to
an undercover police officer. Id.
116. State v. Glosson, 10 FLA. L. WEEKLY 56, 57 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1985).
117. Id. at 57.
118. The court acknowledged as much with a citation to United States v. Kelly, 707
F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983). See supra p. 139. Kelly's last stand
in the court of appeals is at 748 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984). That opinion only discusses the
subjective-entrapment test and not the objective due process defense.
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are not at issue until a particular right is transgressed. The Su-
preme Court of Florida is saddled with the rhetorical question that
Justice Rehnquist posed in United States v. Payner:119 what con-
stitutionally protected right of this defendant was violated? His
right to deal in illegal drugs? His right to deal in illegal drugs only
with "bona-fide" informants? His right to deal in illegal drugs only
with informants acting out of a sense of altruism, or something
other than a desire for economic gain? No court, including the
Glosson court, has even attempted to identify with specificity a
component of the due process clause, state or federal, that the
Glosson scenario implicates.
In lieu of analysis, the court muses that it "can imagine few
situations with more potential for abuse of a defendant's due pro-
cess right." 120 Undoubtedly, every complex criminal investigation
is brimming with the potential for abuse, but courts and constitu-
tions exist to prevent actual transgressions, not speculative, possi-
ble, or potential ones. If Glosson is before the court alleging merely
the potential violation of his rights, then he is not properly before
the court.
The court musters precedent no more persuasively than it
does principle. Alleging that state judges have embraced the objec-
tive due process defense,12" ' it offers a grand total of two citations:
State v. Hohensee 22 and People v. Isaacson.123
The outrageous conduct complained of in Isaacson (the ear-
lier of the two cited cases) victimized the informant, more than the
defendant. Breniman, while out on bail pending appeal for one
drug offense, was arrested for another. It later developed that the
substances that formed the basis for the new arrest were not con-
trolled substances. This fact, however, was kept from Breniman
until long after he had been pressured and bullied into becoming
an informant against the seller of those substances-the defendant
Isaacson. Ultimately, Breniman discharged his obligations as an in-
formant with ruthless mendacity, going so far as to lure Isaacson
119. 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980). Payner involved an especially outrageous attempt by
federal agents to smoke out tax evaders. The stratagem included, inter alia, the use of pros-
titutes. Although Payner ended up a criminal defendant, he was not the one victimized by
the government's scandalous practices. Accordingly, he was without standing to protest.
Glosson was decided on state constitutional grounds; thus, the Glosson court was able to
duck the hard questions raised by Payner.
120. Glosson, 10 FLA. L. WEEKLY 57 (emphasis added).
121. But see Talbot v. State, 251 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1978).
122. 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
123. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
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across the New York State line from Pennsylvania in order to fa-
cilitate the arrest.1 24
What is perhaps most useful about the majority opinion is its
attempt to develop standards for the due process defense. Isaacson
identifies four factors that are symptomatic of outrageous miscon-
duct rising to the level of a constitutional violation: (1) police man-
ufacture of a crime that otherwise would not have occurred; (2)
police participation in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to
a sense of justice; (3) overcoming the defendant's reluctance to
commit the crime by appeals to humanitarian instincts (e.g., sym-
pathy or friendship), by temptation to exorbitant gain, or by per-
sistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and (4) police de-
sire merely to obtain a conviction, rather than preventing crime or
protecting the populace.1 2 Finding evidence of all of these symp-
toms, the Isaacson court dismissed the case on due process
grounds. 26
Whatever the merits of the four Isaacson factors, they do not
refer, even obliquely, to contingent fee arrangements with confi-
dential informants. The Glosson court states and restates that it
was the existence of just such an arrangement that violated due
process. It is difficult to see how Isaacson offers precedential sup-
port for Glosson. And Judge Gabrielli, dissenting in Isaacson, re-
flected on the fundamental problem: Even if the police bullying
and pressuring of Breniman was outrageous, what particular con-
stitutionally-protected right of Isaacson was transgressed? "These
actions .. .in no way violated any of defendant's constitutional
rights."'27
The circumstances of State v. Hohensee128 are so bizarre that
the holding should be limited to the facts, rather than applied ex-
pansively, as precedent. Hohensee acted as a lookout while his
three cohorts committed a burglary. Hohensee was unaware that
his three "cohorts" were in reality a police officer and two paid
police informants. The two informants were "working off charges"
and earning weekly non-contingent salaries. They, along with the
police, knew the defendant as a willing and habitual participant in
burglaries. Mustering the facts to support its finding that due pro-
cess was violated, the court observed:
124. Id. at 514-19, 378 N.E.2d at 79-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-18.
125. Id. at 521-22, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
126. The court acted on state rather than federal, due process grounds. Id. at 82.
127. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
128. 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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If the conduct of (the informants) and Officer Roberts, each act-
ing as a salaried agent of the police department, is subtracted
from the. . . break-in, what remains of that midnight enterprise
is a lone figure, sitting in a parking lot 1/2 block away. It is true
that defendant had criminal intent but his conduct, standing
alone, represented no more of a threat to society than that of a
stargazer, similarly situated, contemplating Polaris.129
It is easy to empathize with the Hohensee opinion. The above-
captioned language is, if anything, restrained. But it tells us little
about the persistent questions attending the due process defense.
What specific acts of the police or its informants violated constitu-
tional rights? Whose rights, and what rights, were violated?
Clearly, Hohensee is no precedent for Glosson. Hohensee in-
volved no contingent fee. The informants were on a flat salary,
which was (from what can be inferred from the opinion) not condi-
tioned on testimony against, or on the ultimate conviction of, the
defendant. By the reasoning of Hohensee, Glosson, a full fledged
participant in the crime for which he was charged, should have
been convicted. By the reasoning of Glosson, Hohensee, not bur-
dened by an informant/witness earning a contingent fee, should
have been convicted. The due process defense swims in subjectivity
with no analytical reed to which to cling.
The facts of Hohensee are unique. The only facts comparably
close to them appear in dicta in United States v. Archer.130 Archer
involved a complex federal plan to prosecute corruption in the
Manhattan District Attorney's office. 3 ' Judge Friendly, writing for
the court, stated:
We do not at all share the Government's pride in its achieve-
ment of causing the bribery of a state assistant district attorney
by a scheme which involved lying to New York police officers
and perjury before New York judges and grand jurors; to our
minds the participants' attempt to set up a federal crime for
which these defendants stand convicted went beyond any proper
prosecutorial role and needlessly injected the Federal Govern-
ment into a matter of state concern. However, we base our re-
versal of these convictions and our instruction to dismiss the in-
dictment on the more limited ground that the Government did
not provide sufficient proof of use or agreement to use interstate
or foreign telephone facilities to satisfy the requirements of the
129. Id. at 274.
130. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
131. Id.
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so-called "Travel Act," 18 U.S.C. § 1952.3'
Although he could not resolve the case on the ground of outra-
geous governmental misconduct, Judge Friendly offered what he
considered to be a limit beyond which government could not go.
"[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement
in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit govern-
ment agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather
evidence to convict other members of a gang of hoodlums."'' 3 For
better or for worse, this is dictum; and pre-Hampton dictum at
that.
Where, then, does the matter stand? Are there any objective
limitations (subjective considerations being the province of the en-
trapment defense at trial) on police conduct vis-a-vis reverse
stings? The general rule must be that the use by the government of
reverse stings, confidential informants, or other special investiga-
tive techniques-without more-gives rise neither to the entrap-
ment defense, nor to any governmental misconduct defense. En-
trapment turns only on the subjective predisposition, if any, of the
defendant. Governmental misconduct gives rise to a defense to
criminal prosecution only in a Rochin-type situation; 34 that is,
where the facts involve direct physical or psychological coercion.
Although these are only general principles, appellate courts should
not strain to create exceptions to them.
Judge Ginsburg, concurring in United States v. Kelly, made a
cogent, albeit reluctant, "state of the art" analysis:
The requisite level of outrageousness, the Supreme Court
has indicated, is not established merely upon a showing of ob-
noxious behavior or even flagrant misconduct on the part of the
police; the broad "fundamental fairness" guarantee, it appears
from High Court decisions, is not transgressed absent "coercion,
violence or brutality to the person." . . . Without further Su-
preme Court elaboration, we have no guide to a more dynamic
definition of the outrageousness concept, and no warrant, as
lower court judges, to devise such a definition in advance of any
signal to do so from higher authority. 13 5
Judge Ginsburg's footnote added: "lower courts have generally
read Supreme Court precedent to confine the broad due process
132. Id. at 672 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 676-77 (footnote omitted).
134. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135. 707 F.2d at 1476 (citations and footnote omitted).
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check on the conduct of law enforcement officers to the slim cate-
gory of cases in which the police have been brutal, employing
against the defendant physical or psychological coercion that
'shocks the conscience.' "1386
Taking Glosson as the exemplar of "drug war/reverse sting"
cases, not even bare allegations of Rochin-type transgressions ap-
pear. What does emerge from the Glosson fact stipulation is that a
police informant was paid contingent fees to initiate reverse sting
investigations. To characterize such police procedures as novel and
creative, or shabby and sneaky is not even the beginning of the
analysis. Mere distaste for such investigative techniques is not a
sufficient basis to hold that they fall below that aggregate of con-
stitutional minimum known as due process. Yet, it was just such
distaste that prompted the Glosson court's declaration that: "[w]e
cannot tolerate such behavior under our system of constitutional
protections.' 137 But precisely what constitutional protections are
undermined is unclear. Applying Judge Ginsburg's analysis in
Kelly, 38 the trial court in Glosson should not have dismissed the
case before trial. It should have permitted the trial to proceed, and
the defense to cross-examine the informant as to his employment,
supervision, and compensation.
A defendant in a reverse sting has the entire panoply of con-
stitutional protections before him. He may not be victimized by an
unreasonable search and seizure, nor by the deprivation of counsel.
He has extra-constitutional protections, such as the entrapment
defense. He has a specific due process right to be free from "vio-
lence or brutality to the person."'3 9 But he has no general due pro-
cess right to be free from flagrant governmental conduct. If the
police unearth his crime with the use of an informant; if that in-
formant is paid on a contingent or percentage basis; if that inform-
ant is part of a reverse sting; if that reverse sting involves police
distribution of contraband to suspects; then, the defendant is with-
out a specific "remedy" for these police practices. The police prac-
tices are themselves a remedy for some of society's most egregious
criminal ills.
The use of dishonest and deceitful informants ... creates risks
to which the attention of juries must be forcefully called, but the
136. Id. at 1476 n.13 (citations omitted).
137. Glosson, 441 So. 2d at 1179.
138. Kelly, 707 F.2d at 1476.
139. Id.
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Due Process Clause does not forbid their employment, detail
their supervision, nor specify their compensation.""
140. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 846 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J.).
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